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BUCKHANNON, SPECIAL EDUCATION DISPUTES, AND 
ATTORNEYS' FEES: 
TIME FOR A CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE AGAIN 
Stefan R. Hanson* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Federal civil rights statutes, including the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act (hereinafter, IDEA or Act), 1 often 
have provisions permitting courts to award attorneys' fees to 
prevailing plaintiffs. Congress intended these fee-shifting 
provisions to encourage plaintiffs to act as private attorneys 
general in enforcing these statutes. Implementing that intent, 
the federal courts, with the exception of those in the Fourth 
Circuit, 2 have used a so-called "catalyst theory" to determine 
whether a plaintiff qualified as a prevailing party for purposes 
of attorney fee-shifting provisions in civil rights statutes. 
Under the catalyst theory, if plaintiffs could demonstrate a 
causal connection between their bringing suit and a 
corresponding change in defendants' behavior, then plaintiffs 
qualified as "prevailing parties" for purposes of attorney fee-
shifting provisions. The catalyst theory did not require a 
judgment in plaintiffs' favor, a judicially sanctioned consent 
decree, or even a formal settlement. 
In Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia 
Department of Health and Human Resources,3 the Supreme 
Court of the United States rejected the catalyst theory. 
Buckhannon held that to qualify as a "prevailing party," a 
party must achieve some form of judicial imprimatur of 
success, such as an enforceable judgment on the merits or a 
*Ph.D. (New York University), J.D. (Chapman University, expected May 2003). 
The author wishes to thank Professor Celestine R. McConville and Dr. Amy E. Hurley 
for their invaluable assistance in developing this paper. 
1. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17 
(1997), 111 Stat. 37 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (2002)). 
2. See S-1 & S-2 v. St. Bd. of Educ. of N.C., 21 F.3d 49 (4th Cir. 1994). 
3. 532 U.S. 598 (2001). 
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court-ordered consent decree. 4 A private settlement would not 
qualify.5 
Buckhannon involved the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 
1988 (FHAA)6 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 
(ADA). 7 However, lower courts, following the Supreme Court's 
lead,8 have applied Buckhannon's holding widely, including to 
special education litigation brought under the IDEA. In IDEA 
litigation, parents and guardians pursue their disabled 
children's rights to a "free and appropriate public education" 
(F APE) through various means: state-level administrative 
mechanisms of compliance complaints, mediation, due process 
hearings, and lawsuits in federal courts. Congress intended 
that the fee-shifting provisions of the IDEA would promote its 
enforcement, ensuring that the approximately 6.1 million 
disabled American children, or 12.5% of the children currently 
enrolled in public school,9 have equal access to FAPE. 
This note examines the impact of Buckhannon on IDEA 
litigation, arguing that Buckhannon undermines the role of the 
IDEA fee-shifting provisions in the enforcement of the IDEA. 
Under the Buckhannon regime, plaintiffs risk incurring 
attorneys' fees far in excess of the value of their claims; even if 
they ultimately obtain all of the relief they originally sought. 
Inevitably, parents will bring fewer claims, however 
meritorious, and more children will be denied the opportunity 
for F APE. In time, fewer disabled children will mature into 
self-sufficient, independent adults-an individual and societal 
harm that Congress intended the IDEA to remedy. 
4. Id. at 604. 
5. Id. at 604 n. 7. 
6. The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430 (1988), 102 
Stat. 1619 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (2002)). 
7. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336 (1990), 104 
Stat. 32 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (2002)). 
8. Chief Justice Rehnquist's introduction in Buckhannon recognizes its holding 
would be much more widely applied: "Numerous federal statutes allow courts to award 
attorneys' fees and costs to the 'prevailing party.' The question presented here is 
whether this term includes a party that has failed to secure a judgment on the merits 
or a court-ordered consent decree, but has nonetheless achieved the desired result 
because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant's conduct. We 
hold that it does not." 532 U.S. at 600. 
9. Natl. Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Off. of Educ. Research & Improvement, U.S. 
Dept. of Educ., Common Core of Data, America's Public Schools, Statistics for Year 
2000, <http://nces.ed.gov/ccdfbat/index/asp> (accessed Jan. 14, 2003). 
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Buckhannon also discourages the early resolution of 
disputes. So even though parents now may initiate fewer 
disputes, those that they do initiate are likely to be protracted. 
As previously stated, to obtain attorneys' fees, plaintiffs must 
emerge as prevailing parties. Since Buckhannon requires a 
court-ordered judgment or consent decree for prevailing party 
status, plaintiffs are less likely to seek settlement, instead 
choosing to persevere to judgment to obtain reimbursement of 
their attorneys' fees. Defendants are also less likely to seek 
early resolution of disputes. At any time up until judgment, 
defendants can provide plaintiffs the relief they seek, thus 
mooting plaintiffs' cases, and thereby denying plaintiffs 
prevailing-party status and attorneys' fees. If the defendants 
do this, plaintiffs will have their relief, but will be responsible 
for their own attorneys' fees. In many cases, the costs to a 
disabled child's family will be considerable, unjust, and 
contrary to the intent of the IDEA. The overall effect will be to 
protract that IDEA litigation that does occur. 
The recent case of J.C., a Connecticut teenager, illustrates 
the detrimental impact of Buckhannon on the IDEA's 
mandate.l0 In 1995, J.C.'s worried parents asked the school 
district to evaluate J.C. to determine his possible eligibility for 
special education services.n The school district did not 
comply.l2 In 1997, the parents repeated their request, and, 
after a meeting, the school district found J. C. ineligible. 13 In 
1998, J.C. vandalized a school bus, and the school district 
scheduled an expulsion hearing. 14 In response, J.C.'s family 
hired an attorney who filed for due process hearing under the 
IDEA to address whether the school district should provide J.C. 
special education rather than expel him. 15 The school district 
then met with J.C.'s parents and their attorney and reached a 
settlement agreement in which J.C.'s parents obtained all the 
relief they had sought in their due process filing. 16 
Subsequently, J.C. and the school district convened the due 
process hearing solely for the purpose of adopting the 
10. J.C. v. Bd. of Educ., 278 F .3d 119 (2d Cir. 2002). 
11. Id. at 121 
12. Id. 
13. Id. at 121-122. 
14. Id. at 122. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
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agreement as an official decision and orderY At the hearing, 
however, the school district refused to cooperate with this 
process, causing the hearing officer to issue a final written 
decision dismissing the hearing issues as moot. 18 The school 
district then proceeded to comply with the terms of the 
settlement agreement.19 
When the school district refused to pay J.C.'s attorneys' 
fees, his parents flied suit in federal district court seeking 
attorneys' fees as a prevailing party under the IDEA. 20 
Applying the catalyst theory, the District Court awarded J.C.'s 
parents nearly $14,000 in attorneys' fees. 21 Following the 
District Court's decision, the Supreme Court decided 
Buckhannon. On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
retroactively applied Buckhannon to J.C.'s case and reversed 
the District Court,22 in effect rendering J.C.'s parents 
responsible for their own attorneys' fees. 
J. C. illustrates how Buckhannon has shifted the costs and 
risks associated with IDEA enforcement onto the families of 
disabled children. As J.C. shows, parents who initiate an 
IDEA dispute, or accept an early resolution of an IDEA 
dispute, risk substantial attorneys' fees even when they prevail 
entirely. This new regime creates incentives inconsistent with 
the goals of the IDEA and thwarts congressional intent. Since 
the claims in IDEA litigation are often equitable or relatively 
small in value, plaintiffs' attorneys' fees may approach or 
exceed the value of the relief obtained. Congress did not intend 
for families of disabled children, acting as private attorneys 
general, to shoulder such a degree of risk in the assertion of 
their children's right to a FAPE. Instead, Congress intended to 
encourage the filing of meritorious claims. Overall, 
Buckhannon's effect is to deny more disabled children, an 
especially vulnerable minority, their constitutional right to a 
FAPE. 
The remainder of this note discusses these ideas in greater 
detail. Part II reviews the legislative history of the IDEA, and 
17. ld. 
18. ld. 
19. Id. at 122. 
20. Id. 
21. J.C. v. Reg!. Sch. Dist. No. 10, 115 F. Supp. 2d 297, 302 (D. Conn. 2000), 
overruled, 278 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2002). 
22. J.C., 278 F.3d at 125. 
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Part III discusses the history of attorney fee-shifting provisions 
in the IDEA. Part IV then reviews the Buckhannon decision 
and its impact on IDEA litigation. Finally, Part V discusses 
judicial solutions to the Buckhannon problem and ultimately 
argues that congressional remedial action is necessary to 
preserve disabled children's educational rights, and toward this 
end, it proposes a legislative remedy. 
II. THE LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND OF THE INDIVIDUALS WITH 
DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT 
Federal law currently requires the states to provide the 
same educational opportunities to children with disabilities as 
they do to children without disabilities. Protection for children 
with disabilities essentially began with the Education for All 
Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (EAHCA).23 Prior to that 
time, there was little commitment to the education of 
handicapped children in the states' public school systems. 
While Congress has amended the law several times over the 
years, it has remained committed to the goal of providing equal 
educational opportunities for disabled children by offering 
funding to states for the education of disabled children in 
public schools. 24 
This legislative commitment to the education of disabled 
children emerged over time from an interweaving of general 
civil rights legislation and legislation specifically designed to 
protect the disabled. Even early civil rights legislation, dating 
back to the Civil Rights Act of 1871,25 still has relevance for the 
equal protection claims of disabled children to a F APE. 
Historically, however, the EAHCA is more closely associated 
with the civil rights movements of the 1950s and 1960s. 
Legislation associated with the EAHCA included the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973,26 the first significant civil rights law 
to address the issue of discrimination against the disabled. 
Before the Rehabilitation Act, federal efforts to help the 
23. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-192 
(1975), 89 Stat. 773, (also known as the Education of the Handicapped Act (ERA)). 
24. Mark C. Weber, The Transformation of the Education of the Handicapped Act: 
A Study in the Interpretation of Radical Statutes, 24 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 349 (1990). 
25. The Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). 
26. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112 (1973) (codified, as 
amended, at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2002)). 
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disabled had not addressed civil rights per se, but instead had 
focused on vocational rehabilitation. The most important 
provision of the Rehabilitation Act is Section 504, which 
provides that "[n]o otherwise qualified handicapped individual 
in the United States ... shall, solely by reason of his handicap, 
be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, 
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity 
receiVmg Federal financial assistance."27 While the 
Rehabilitation Act originally sought to end employment 
discrimination against the handicapped,28 the broad language 
of Section 504 has had the effect of protecting the handicapped 
from discrimination in nearly all situations in which a 
potential discriminator receives federal financial assistance. 29 
Section 504 prohibits the denial of "benefits of ... any program 
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance" and still 
serves to protect the disabled from discrimination in education 
as well as employment and other "activities or programs" that 
receive federal funds. 30 In 1978, the Department of Health 
Education and Welfare issued regulations to implement 
Section 504 that specifically stated that disabled children were 
entitled to "free and appropriate" educational opportunities and 
that "services should be designed to meet the individual 
educational needs of handicapped persons." 31 
As with the Rehabilitation Act, the EAHCA reflects 
congressional intent in the 1970s to guarantee equal rights to 
persons with disabilities. The Rehabilitation Act focused on 
expanding and improving the tradition of vocational 
rehabilitation,32 while the EAHCA focused on guaranteeing 
equal educational opportunity for handicapped children.33 The 
sweep of the Rehabilitation Act, through Section 504, became, 
27. Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394. 
28. Jonathan C. Drimmer, Cripples, Overcomers, And Civil Rights: Tracing The 
Evolution of Federal Legislation and Social Policy For People With Disabilities, 40 
UCLA L. Rev. 1341 (1993). 
29. Id. at 1385. 
30. 87 Stat. at 394. 
31. 45 C.F.R § 84.33(a), (b) (1992) (cited in Weber, supra n. 24, at 368). 
32. Drimmer, supra n. 28, at 1382. 
33. The Senate Report accompanying the EAHCA noted that "[t]his Nation has 
long embraced a philosophy that the right to a free appropriate public education is 
basic to equal opportunity and is vital to secure the future and the prosperity of our 
people." Sen. Rpt. 94-168, at 9 (June 2, 1975) (reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 
1433). 
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and has remained, much broader than its vocational roots. 
Today, both acts provide overlapping and parallel protections 
to children with disabilities. 34 
The EAHCA was the first substantial federal commitment 
specifically to ensure the access of disabled children to a F APE. 
Earlier federal efforts had been less comprehensive and lacked 
sufficient funding to support their intent. 35 In 1972, two 
groundbreaking federal cases recognized that there was 
widespread systemic denial of disabled children's statutory 
right to F APE: Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children 
v. Pennsylvania36 and Mills v. Board of Education. 31 These two 
cases, along with twenty-seven decisions in the several states, 
34. For example, The Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Department of Education 
currently enforces Section 504 and investigates complaints of discrimination by 
institutions rece1vmg federal funds, such as schools. See 
<http://www .ed.gov/offices/OCR> (accessed Jan. 14, 2003). 
35. These federal legislative efforts included establishing the Bureau of the 
Education for the Handicapped in 1966 by amendment to the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act, Pub. L. No. 89-750. Then, in 1971, Congress passed a 
separate act, the Education of the Handicapped Act, Pub. L. No. 91-230. The 
Education of the Handicapped Amendments of 1973 extended the Act for three years 
beginning in July 1, 1973. This legislative history is detailed in Sen. Rpt. 94-168, at 5 
(June 2, 1975) (reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1429). 
36. Pa. Assn. for Retarded Children v. Pa., 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972). 
Based on the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
the court held the proposed consent decree to be fair and reasonable to plaintiff; the 
Court prefaced its order by stating, " ... [A)pproval means that plaintiff retarded 
children who heretofore had been excluded from a public program of education and 
training will no longer be so excluded after September 1, 1972. This is a noble and 
humanitarian end in which the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has chosen to join. 
Today, with the following Order, this group of citizens will have new hope in their 
quest for a life of dignity and self-sufficiency." !d. at 302. 
37. Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). In Mills, the District 
Court of the District of Columbia established the constitutional equal protection basis 
for access to education of disabled children. The District Court wrote as follows: 
The Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 
(1954), stated: "Today, education is perhaps the most important function of 
state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the 
great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the 
importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the 
performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the 
armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a 
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing 
him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to 
his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably 
be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. 
Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right 
which must be made available to all on equal terms. 
Id. at 875 (emphasis added). 
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repeatedly affirmed the rights of disabled children to equal 
opportunity to a F APE. ss 
Responding to this case law, Congress recognized that 
"[i]ncreased awareness of the educational needs of handicapped 
children ... pointed to the necessity of an expanded Federal 
fiscal role."39 Congress also found "that of the more than 8 
million children (between birth and twenty-one years of age) 
with handicapping conditions requiring special education and 
related services, only 3.9 million such children are receiving a 
free and appropriate education. 1. 75 million ... receive no 
educational services at all." 40 Earlier statutes did not offer the 
states sufficient financial help and incentives to ensure 
disabled children received a FAPE. Under these 
circumstances, Congress passed the Education of the 
Handicapped Amendments of 1974.41 These amendments drew 
upon the holdings of the federal and state legal cases that 
affirmed disabled children's rights to equal education. 
Specifically, the amendments provided for substantial 
additional financial assistance to the states to identify, locate, 
and evaluate all handicapped children. They also provided for 
the protection of handicapped children's rights by due process 
procedures. 42 These amendments became the basis for the 
EAHCA enacted in 1975. 
Overall, EAHCA emphasized procedure over substance. To 
receive funding under EAHCA, a state had to demonstrate that 
it has in effect a policy that assures all handicapped children 
the right to a free appropriate public education.43 EAHCA 
contained detailed procedures to which states needed to adhere 
to demonstrate a compliant policy and to ensure their 
eligibility for funding. 
Also, EAHCA due process procedures involved detailed 
steps for designing a disabled child's education plan and the 
resolution of disagreements between parents and local 
educational agencies. Congress deliberately relied upon the 
38. Sen. Rpt. 94-168, at 6 (June 2, 1975) (reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 
1430). 
39. Id. at 5. 
40. Id. at 8 (as reported by Bureau of Education for the Handicapped). 
41. Education of the Handicapped Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 
Stat. 576 (1974). 
42. Sen. Rpt. 94-168, at 6-7 (June 2, 1975) (reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 
1430-1431). 
43. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1) (1975). 
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"procedural safeguards of rights as the means to achieve the 
broader substantive goal that 'handicapped' children would 
receive an 'appropriate' education in integrated settings."44 
Also, a contemporaneous congressional staff member 
commented, "[Y]ou have to go for procedural safeguards rather 
than substantive things; they're too hard to deal with in 
litigation. The judges can deal with procedures."45 This 
congressional focus on the detailed procedures of delivering 
FAPE, rather than a focus on the detailed substance of FAPE, 
became a hallmark of the EAHCA. 
The Supreme Court's decision in Board of Education u. 
Rowley46 affirmed the EAHCA emphasis on procedure over 
substance.47 There the Court considered the substantive 
meaning of a F APE for a disabled child under the EAHCA. 48 
The parents of Amy Rowley, an eight-year old deaf child, had 
asked their school district to provide Amy with a sign-language 
interpreter for her classroom.49 The school district declined, 
asserting that it had provided other personalized instruction 
and related services. 50 Amy's parents maintained that their 
school district was denying Amy a F APE by denying her a 
classroom interpreter. 51 The District Court and the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals found for Amy's parents, but the 
Supreme Court reversed. 52 
The Supreme Court found that since Amy was performing 
above average in school, and since the school district had 
offered other accommodations, the EAHCA did not require the 
school district to provide Amy with a sign-language interpreter 
in order for Amy to receive a F APE. 53 The Court found that a 
state satisfied the EAHCA's FAPE requirement when it 
provided instruction and services to afford a handicapped child 
44. David M. Engel, Law, Culture, and Children with Disabilities: Educational 
Rights and the Construction of Difference, 1991 Duke L.J. 166, 178 (1991). 
45. ld. at 178 (citing D. Neal & D. Kirp, The Allure of Legalization Reconsidered: 
The Case of Special Education, 22 (Stan. U. Inst. for Research on Educational Finance 
& Governance Rep. No. 82-A27 1983). 
46. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982). 
47. ld. at 177. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 184. 
50. I d. 
51. ld. at 185. 
52. ld. at 177. 
53. Id. at 185. 
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"some educational benefit."54 It concluded that the EAHCA 
intended to confer "some educational benefit" upon a disabled 
child, rather than to "maximiz[e] the potential" of the disabled 
child.55 So, as a result, since Rowley, a FAPE for a disabled 
child has meant an educational program that confers "some 
educational benefit" upon the disabled child. 56 
As part of the procedures of the EAHCA, Congress detailed 
the requirements for a disabled child's "individualized 
educational plan" (IEP).57 An IEP details the educational 
approach intended to meet the unique needs of the disabled 
child. The plan would be developed in a meeting attended by 
representatives of the local educational agency, the child's 
teacher(s), the child's parent(s) or guardian(s), and, where 
appropriate, the child. 58 The written IEP document should 
contain: 
(A) a statement of the present levels of educational 
performance of such child, (B) a statement of annual 
goals, including short-term instructional objectives, (C) 
a statement of the specific educational services to be 
provided to such child, and the extent to which such 
child will be able to participate in regular educational 
programs, (D) the projected date for initiation and 
anticipated duration of such services, and (E) 
appropriate objective criteria and evaluation procedures 
and schedules for determining, on at least an annual 
basis, whether instructional objectives are being 
achieved. 59 
According to the EAHCA, the IEP team must review and 
potentially revise the IEP at least annually.60 
In 1990, Congress passed a series of technical amendments 
to the EAHCA primarily to replace the term "handicap" with 
"disability" and "handicapped" with "disabled." Also, Congress 
54. ld. at 200. 
55. Id. 
56. The substantive standard of "some educational benefit" for a F APE has 
remained as the federal standard. Some states have had or have higher substantive 
standards. In Michigan, the standard is "to develop the maximum potential" of the 
disabled child. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.§ 380.1751(1) (cited in Dong v. Bd of Educ., 197 
F.3d 793, 799--800 (6th Cir. 1999)). 
57. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18) (1975). 
58. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19) (1975). 
59. Id. 
60. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(a)(5), 1413(a)(ll) (1975). 
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renamed the EAHCA the "Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act" (IDEA). 61 These changes left the content of the 
Act essentially unchanged. 
The due process procedural safeguards of the IDEA 
(formerly, the EAHCA) include two primary enforcement 
mechanisms designed to protect disabled children's rights to a 
FAPE. First, the IDEA specifically provides for impartial due 
process hearings62 with the right of appeal to the district 
court.63 Other procedural safeguards associated with the 
administrative due process hearings include the right to 
counsel, the right to present evidence, and the right to present, 
confront, and compel the attendance ofwitnesses.64 
The second enforcement mechanism is the Complaint 
Resolution Process (CRP) at the state level.65 Under the CRP 
regulations, a State Education Agency (SEA) must develop 
written procedures to resolve complaints. Typically, although 
not always, complaints about the failure of a local educational 
agency (LEA) to comply with an agreed-upon IEP are 
addressed through the CRP. Disputes regarding the content of 
the IEP typically are directed through the administrative due 
process hearing procedure. 66 Under the minimum federal 
complaint procedures, SEAs must act within 60 days after a 
complaint is filed to 1) carry out an independent on-site 
investigation; 2) give the complainant the opportunity to 
submit additional information about the allegations in the 
complaint; 3) review all relevant information and make an 
independent determination; 4) issue a written decision with 
findings of fact and conclusions; 5) include steps for the 
61. Pub. L. No. 101-476, § 901, 104 Stat. 1103 (1990). 
62. 20 U .S.C. § 1415(f)(l) (1997). 
63. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g), (i) (1997). 
64. 20 U .S.C. § 1415(h) (1997). 
65. The provisions regarding state level complaint resolution procedures appear 
in the IDEA implementing regulations. 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.660-300.662 (1999). See also 
20 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(3) (2002) (authorizing the Secretary of Education to " ... make, 
promulgate, issue, rescind, and amend rules and regulations governing the manner of 
operation of, and governing the applicable programs administered by the 
Department"). 
66. Section 300.661, a newly developed subsection of the IDEA federal 
regulations, reflects that some issues may be presented as both complaints and due 
process hearings and calls for the SEA to set aside those portions of a complaint that 
are also the subject of a due process hearing until the resolution of the hearing. 34 
C.F.R. § 300.66l(c) (1999). 
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effective implementation of the decision; and 6) provide the 
reasons for the SEAs decision. 67 
In the 1997 reauthorization of the IDEA, Congress 
introduced mediation into the specific procedural remedies 
offered under the Act. 68 The provisions for mediation required 
that 1) the mediation be voluntary,69 2) the mediation not be 
used to delay the parent's right to a due process hearing, 70 3) 
the mediation be conducted by a qualified, impartial, and 
trained mediator,71 4) any agreement reached in mediation be 
in writing, 72 5) no content of mediation discussions be used in 
any subsequent due process hearing, 73 and 6) the state bear the 
cost of the mediation.74 
Two trends foreshadowed the congressional introduction of 
mediation into the IDEA procedural safeguards in the 1997 
reauthorization. First, many states already had introduced 
voluntary mediation procedures into their own special 
education procedural safeguards. Second, many concerned 
parties had notified Congress that from the perspective of 
many school district officials, the IDEA promoted costly 
litigation, especially since attorneys' fees for both parties to any 
litigation could easily become costs to a school district.75 Thus, 
Congress expressed its intent as follows: 
To encourage early resolution of problems whenever 
possible, section 615 requires States to offer mediation 
as a voluntary option to parents and LEAs as an initial 
process for resolving disputes. However, the bill 
requires that a State's mediation system may not be 
used to delay or deny a parents right to due process .... 
The committee is aware that, in States where mediation 
is being used, litigation has been reduced, and parents 
and schools have resolved their differences amicably, 
making decisions with the child's best interest in mind. 
67. 34 C.F.R. § 300.661 (1999). 
68. Steven Marchese, Putting Square Pegs Into Round Holes: Mediation and the 
Rights of Children With Disabilities Under the IDEA, 53 Rutgers L. Rev. 333, 346 
(2001). 
69. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2)(A)(i) (1997). 
70. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2)(A)(ii) (1997). 
71. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2)(A)(iii) (1997). 
72. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2)(F) (1997). 
73. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2)(G) (1997). 
74. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2)(D) (1997). 
75. 143 Cong. Rec. 84354-02 (1997) (statement of Sen. Gorton). 
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It is the committee's strong preference that mediation 
become the norm for resolving disputes under IDEA. 
The committee believes that the availability of 
mediation will ensure that far fewer conflicts will 
proceed to the next procedural steps, formal due process 
and litigation, outcomes that the committee believes 
should be avoided when possible.76 
Also, President Clinton at the time had noted that the 
introduction of mediation into the procedural safeguards of the 
IDEA built upon the success story of the Act.77 
III. THE HISTORY OF A'ITORNEYS' FEES REIMBURSEMENT 
PROVISIONS IN THE IDEA 
Originally, the EAHCA had no prov1s1on for the 
reimbursement of attorneys' fees for prevailing plaintiffs. But 
the Civil Rights Act 78 and the Rehabilitation Act, 79 which have 
relevance and applicability to the disabled child's assertion of 
his or her right to a F APE, have attorney fee-shifting 
provisions. The Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 
197680 provides for attorneys' fees for a prevailing plaintiff in 
76. Sen. Rpt. 105-17, at 26-27 (May 9, 1997). 
77. 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 147 (Statement by President William J. Clinton upon 
signing H.R. 5.). 
78. 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as amended, (1996) reads as follows: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, 
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within 
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party 
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 
redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act 
or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not 
be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was 
unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable 
exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of 
the District of Columbia. 
79. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1973) reads as follows: 
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States, as 
defmed in section 705(20) of this title, shall, solely by reason of her or his 
disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or 
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by 
any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service. 
80. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). The section of the act regarding attorneys' fees in 
civil rights action, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (b) reads as follows: 
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 198la, 
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an action brought under the Civil Rights Act. Also, section 505 
of the Rehabilitation Act of 197381 provides for the award of 
attorneys' fees to a prevailing plaintiff in an action brought 
under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Perhaps because 
of these fee-shifting provisions, in the early years of the 
EAHCA, claims for FAPE brought under the EAHCA also often 
included claims brought under both the Civil Rights Act and 
the Rehabilitation Act. 
In its 1984 decision in Smith u. Robinson, 82 however, the 
Supreme Court held that disabled children asserting their civil 
rights under the EAHCA could not rely on intertwined or 
related claims brought under Section 1983 or Section 504 as a 
way of obtaining reimbursement for attorneys' fees. 83 The 
Smith Court held that the comprehensiveness and detail of the 
EAHCA administrative provisions indicated that Congress did 
not intend for disabled children to rely upon statutes other 
than the EAHCA, including the Civil Rights Act or the 
Rehabilitation Act, as a means to assert their claim to a 
F APE. 84 As a result of Smith, disabled children who prevailed 
1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318 [20 
U.S.C.A. § 1681 et seq.], the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 [42 
U.S.C.A. § 2000bb et seq.], the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 
Persons Act of 2000 [42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc et seq.], title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d et seq.], or section 13981 of this title, the 
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United 
States, a reasonable attorneys' fee as part of the costs, except that in any 
action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such 
officer's judicial capacity such officer shall not be held liable for any costs, 
including attorneys' fees, unless such action was clearly in excess of such 
officer's jurisdiction. 
81. 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2) (1973) reads as follows: "The remedies, procedures, and 
rights set forth in title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) et seq.] 
shall be available to any person aggrieved by any act or failure to act by any recipient 
of Federal assistance or Federal provider of such assistance under section 794 of this 
title." 
29 USC § 794 a(b) states, "In any action or proceeding to enforce or charge a 
violation of a provision of this subchapter, the court, in its discretion, may allow the 
prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of 
the costs." 
82. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984). 
83. Id. at 1020. 
84. Id. at 1020-1021. In response to the broader Smith holding, Congress 
amended the IDEA to restore disabled children equal access to the broad range of 
federal constitutional and statutory protections. In its 1999 decision Witte v. Clark 
County School District, 197 F.3d 1271 (1999), the Ninth Circuit cited to the amended 
section, "IDEA§ 1415(1), previously found at 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f), provides: Nothing in 
this chapter shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies 
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in a claim for F APE brought under the EAHCA had no way of 
obtaining reimbursement of their attorneys' fees. 
The dissent in Smith argued that the majority misapplied 
the principles of statutory construction,85 and applied an 
unnecessarily restrictive interpretation of the Civil Rights and 
Rehabilitation Acts.86 As Justice Brennan asserted in his 
dissent: 
Congress will now have to take the time to revisit the 
matter. And until it does, the handicapped children of 
this country whose difficulties are compounded by 
discrimination and by other deprivations of 
constitutional rights will have to pay the costs. It is at 
best ironic that the Court has managed to impose this 
burden on handicapped children in the course of 
interpreting a statute wholly intended to promote the 
educational rights of those children. 87 
The dissent proved prescient as Congress, in 1986, passed 
the Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986 (HCPA) 
providing authority for the reimbursement of attorneys' fees to 
prevailing plaintiffs in claims brought under the EAHCA. 88 
The HCPA amended the EAHCA and provided that parents or 
guardians of a handicapped child or youth could at the court's 
discretion be awarded reasonable attorneys' fees based on the 
prevailing rate within the community.89 These amendments 
available under the Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 [42 
U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.], Title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [29 U.S.C. § 79[1] et 
seq.], or other Federal laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities" 197 F.3d 
1271, 1274--1275 (1999). In an accompanying footnote, the Witte court explained the 
congressional intent, "[t]his section restored the availability of remedies under the 
federal Constitution and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended in 
29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988), for deprivation of disabled students' education rights, after the 
Supreme Court's restrictive decision in Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 104 S.Ct. 
3457, 82 L.Ed.2d 746 (1984), that such remedies were unavailable. At the same time 
Congress reaffirmed the necessity of exhausting the IDEA's administrative procedures 
before seeking judicial relief on these alternate theories." Witte, 197 F.3d at 1275 n. 2. 
85. Smith, 468 U.S. at 1024. 
86. Id. at 1025. 
87. Id. at 1031 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
88. Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 
796 (1986). The preamble reads: "An Act to amend the Education of the Handicapped 
Act to authorize the award of reasonable attorneys' fees to certain prevailing parties, to 
clarify the effect of the Education of the Handicapped Act on rights, procedures, and 
remedies under other laws relating to the prohibition of discrimination, and for other 
purposes." 
89. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B), (C) (1986). 
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prohibited an award if, at least ten days before the due process 
hearing, the school district had made a settlement offer to the 
parents that the parents rejected and the court or 
administrative officer subsequently found that the judgment 
for the parents was not more favorable than the settlement 
offer, 90 provided the parents were not otherwise substantially 
justified in rejecting the settlement offer. 91 These amendments 
also offered the court discretion to reduce attorneys' fee awards 
if plaintiffs unnecessarily protracted a proceeding or the fees 
sought were unreasonable considering the nature of the action 
or proceeding.92 Finally, the amendments authorized the court 
to consider whether the defendants had unnecessarily 
protracted the proceedings or otherwise had not complied with 
the intent of the fee-shifting provisions when considering 
plaintiffs' conduct for purposes of awarding fees.93 
The terms "prevailing party" and "reasonable," which 
appeared in the HCPA, came to occupy courts in future 
litigation regarding attorneys' fees in special education 
litigation. In the Senate Report prepared in conjunction with 
the Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986,94 Congress 
stated that it intended the terms "prevailing party" and 
"reasonable" to be construed consistently with the Supreme 
Court's 1983 decision in Hensley v. Eckerhart. 95 In Hensley, the 
Court defined the terms as follows: 
The extent of a plaintiffs success is a crucial factor in 
determining the proper amount of an award of 
attorneys' fees. Where the plaintiff has failed to prevail 
on a claim that is distinct in all respects from his 
successful claims, the hours spent on the unsuccessful 
claim should be excluded in considering the amount of a 
reasonable fee. Where a lawsuit consists of related 
claims, a plaintiff who has won substantial relief should 
not have his attorneys' fee reduced simply because the 
district court did not adopt each contention raised. But 
where the plaintiff achieved only limited success, the 
90. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(i) (1986). 
91. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(E) (1986). 
92. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(F) (1986). 
93. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(G) (1986). 
94. Sen. Rpt. 99-112, 1803-04 (July 25, 1985). 
95. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983). 
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district court should award only that amount of fees 
that is reasonable in relation to the results obtained.96 
535 
Notably, congressional intent regarding the definitions of 
"prevailing parties" and "reasonable" did not change between 
this 1985 Senate Report and the 1997 Senate Report 
accompanying reauthorization ofthe IDEA in 1997.97 
Since the enactment of the HCPA, actual recovery of 
attorneys' fees by prevailing parents has varied to some extent 
by enforcement mechanism and jurisdiction. In the federal 
courts, there has been only one situation, that of attorney-
parents representing their own children, in which prevailing 
plaintiffs have been unable to recover attorneys' fees for their 
IDEA claims.98 The Fourth Circuit, for example, based its 
denial of such fees on a "special circumstances" public policy99 
designed to encourage the "very best representation" for 
disabled children pursuing IDEA claims and to avoid the 
potential that an emotionally charged parent will inadequately 
represent his minor child. 100 
Regarding other IDEA enforcement mechanisms, questions 
have arisen as to whether they are properly considered 
"actions" or "proceedings" as defined in the IDEA attorneys' 
fee-shifting provisions. 101 The current judicial consensus is 
that administrative due process hearings are "proceedings" 
under the IDEA, and that the attorney fee-shifting provisions 
of the IDEA apply to disputes resolved at that level without 
appeal to the district court. 102 
96. Id. at 440. 
97. The 1997 Senate Report addresses these issues as follows: "Questions have 
been raised regarding the relationship between the extent of success of the parents and 
the amount of attorneys' fees a court may award. In addressing this question, the 
committee believes the amount of any award of attorneys' fees to a prevailing party 
under part B shall be determined in accordance with the law established by the 
Supreme Court in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983), and its progeny. As we 
stated in the 1986 report accompanying the legislation that added the attorneys' fees 
provtswns: 'It is the committee's intent that the terms "prevailing party'' and 
"reasonable" be construed consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Hensley 
v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 440 (1983).'" Sen. Rpt. 105-17, at 26 (May 9, 1997); see also 
H.R. Rpt. 105-95 (1997). 
98. Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 165 F.3d 260 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1159 
(1999). See also, Woodside v Bd. of Educ., 2000 WL 92096 (E.D. Pa. 2000). 
99. Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 437 (1991) (cited in Doe, 165 F.3d at 263). 
100. Doe, 165 F.3d at 263. 
101. 20 U .S.C.§ 1415(i)(3)(B). 
102. See e.g. Brown v. Griggsville Community Unit Sch. Dist. No. 4, 12 F.3d 681 
(7th Cir. 1993), Kletzelman v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 91 F.3d 68, 70 (9th Cir. 
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There is a split in the federal courts as to whether 
prevailing parents can recover attorneys' fees resulting from 
CRPs. The Ninth Circuit and the District Court of Vermont 
have held that these procedures are proceedings as per the 
IDEA and that attorneys' fees accordingly are recoverable. 103 
The District Court of Vermont found that "[a]s a matter of 
public policy, disallowing the recovery of attorneys' fees for 
work done in CRPs would discourage settlement of IDEA 
claims."104 In contrast, the federal district court in Minnesota 
has twice held that CRPs were not an "action or proceeding" for 
the purposes of IDEA's attorneys' fees provisions. The 
Minnesota court acknowledged the Ninth Circuit's opposing 
holding, but disagreed without any accompanying argument. 105 
The Eastern District of New York has also reviewed the split 
among the federal courts and found that CRPs are not actions 
or proceedings for purposes of the attorney fee-shifting 
provisions of the IDEA.lD6 
In some instances, courts have awarded parents attorneys' 
fees incurred in mediation, without specific contractual 
agreement in the settlement, and without a preliminary 
request for a due process hearing, provided the parents 
obtained some of the relief they were seeking through the 
mediation process. 107 Courts awarding these fees for mediation 
1996); McSomebodies v. Burlingame Elementary Sch. Dist., 897 F.2d 974, 975 (9th Cir. 
1989). 
103. Lucht v. Molalla River Sch. Dist., 225 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2000). See also 
Upper Valley Assn. for Handicapped Citizens v. Blue Mt. Union Sch. Dist., 973 F. Supp. 
429 (D. Vt. 1997). 
104. Upper Valley, 973 F. Supp. at 436. 
105. Johnson v. Fridley, 2002 WL 334403, 3 (D. Minn. 2002). 
106. Vultaggio v. Bd. of Educ., 2002 WL 1889645 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). The Vultaggio 
court bolstered its decision by noting that the text of the relevant statute had changed 
since the Upper Valley Association, 973 F. Supp. 429 (see supra n. 103) decision: 
When Upper Valley was decided, Section 1415(b)(6) stated that the 
procedures required by the IDEA 'include but shall not be limited to' the 
procedures enumerated in that section. Today, .... amended Section 
1415(b)(6) states that the procedures required by the IDEA 'shall include' 
only the procedures referred the [sic] section-the 'but shall not be limited to' 
language was removed. 
Vultaggio, 2002 WL 1889645 at 8 (citing Megan C., 57 F. Supp. 2d 776, 784). The 
Vultaggio court also found that the informality of CRPs provided a policy reason in 
support of the denial of attorneys' fee recovery. Given the contrary holding of Upper 
Valley Association, the Vultaggio decision has created a split within the Second Circuit 
regarding parents' recovery of attorneys' fees in CRPs. 
107. See e.g. E.M. v. Bd. of Educ., 849 F. Supp. 312 (D.N.J. 1994); Massotti v. 
Tustin Unified Sch. Dist., 806 F. Supp. 221, 223 (C.D_ Cal. 1992); K.A.L. v. Bd. of 
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work generally relied upon the catalyst theory, which has been 
rejected by Buckhannon. 10B 
The so-called catalyst theory developed as part of the 
private enforcement of civil rights. For purposes of fee-shifting 
provisions contained in civil rights legislation, the catalyst 
theory allowed plaintiffs to be considered "prevailing parties" 
so long as the plaintiffs could demonstrate a causal connection 
between their bringing suit and the change in the defendant's 
behavior. 109 As an example, the Third Circuit permitted 
recovery as a prevailing party if "(1) the plaintiff obtained relief 
on a significant claim in the litigation; and (2) there [was] a 
causal connection between the litigation and the relief obtained 
from the defendant."110 
In special education litigation, the catalyst theory had 
become key to the enforcement of the IDEA. Through the 
catalyst theory, prevailing parents were able to obtain 
attorneys' fees and costs as a result of settlement agreements 
and mediation without the requirement that courts or 
administrative officers enter case outcomes into the record or 
create any form of judicial imprimatur whatsoever. Before 
Buckhannon, only the Fourth Circuit had expressly rejected 
the catalyst theory in IDEA litigation.111 
IV. THE BUCKHANNON DECISION 
A. The Decision 
In May 2001, in Buckhannon Board and Care Home v. West 
Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, 112 the 
Supreme Court113overruled the common practice of nine federal 
circuits to award attorneys' fees to prevailing plaintiffs in civil 
Educ .. 1994 WL 327160, 4 (D.N.J. 1994) (cited in Upper Valley, 973 F. Supp. at 435). 
108. See e.g. E.M., 849 F. Supp. at 316. 
109. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 626 (citations omitted). 
110. P.O. v. Bd. of Educ., 124 F. Supp. 2d 251, 259 (D. N.J. 2000) (quoting Metro 
Pittsburgh Crusade for Voters v. City of Pittsburg, 964 F.2d 244, 250 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(quoting Dunn v. U. S., 842 F.2d 1420, 1433 (3d Cir. 1988))). 
111. See S-1 & S-2, 21 F. 3d 49. 
112. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. 598. 
113. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court in which Justices 
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined. Justice Scalia also filed a concurring 
opinion in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion in 
which Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer joined. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 599. 
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rights litigation under the catalyst theory.ll4 By rejecting the 
catalyst theory, Buckhannon necessarily changed the practice 
of shifting attorneys' fees in special education litigation. 115 
A 1992 Supreme Court decision, Farrar v. Hobby, 
foreshadowed the holding in Buckhannon. 116 In Farrar, a civil 
rights case filed under Section 1983, the Court examined how 
the term "prevailing party" had come to be defined in civil 
rights litigation. 117 The Court noted that "a plaintiff 'prevails' 
when actual relief on the merits of [the] claim materially alters 
the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the 
defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the 
plaintiff." 118 According to the Court," [n]o material alteration of 
the legal relationship between the parties occurs until the 
plaintiff becomes entitled to enforce a judgment, consent 
decree, or settlement against the defendant."119 In Farrar, the 
Court found that the plaintiff was a prevailing party, and 
therefore should be eligible for attorneys' fees. 120 However, the 
Court held that the nominal damages awarded to the plaintiff 
symbolized the lack of success on the merits, and thus, this 
particular plaintiff was ineligible to recover attorneys' fees 
under the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act. 121 
Taking its lead from Farrar, the Fourth Circuit rejected the 
catalyst theory for Section 1983 claims. In S-1 and S-2 v. State 
Board of Education of North Carolina, 122 parents of a disabled 
child filed suit against the local school district board as well as 
114. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 602 n. 3, cites to these examples: Stanton v. S. 
Berkshire Regl. Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 574, 577 n. 2 (1st Cir. 1999); Marbley v. Bane, 57 
F.3d 224, 234 (2d Cir. 1995); Baumgartner v. Harrisburg Housing Authority, 21 F.3d 
541, 546-550 (3rd Cir. 1994); Payne v. Bd. of Educ., 88 F.3d 392, 397 (6th Cir. 1996); 
Zinn v. Shalala, 35 F.3d 273, 276 (7th Cir. 1994); Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski Cty. 
Sch. Dist., # 1, 17 F.3d 260, 263 n. 2 (8th Cir. 1994); Kilgour v. Pasadena, 53 F.3d 1007, 
1010 (9th Cir. 1995); Beard v. Teska, 31 F.3d 942, 951-952 (lOth Cir. 1994); Morris v. 
West Palm Beach, 194 F.3d 1203, 1207 (11th Cir. 1999). Justice Ginsburg, in her 
dissent, cites to the identical cases as examples of affirmation of the catalyst theory by 
a majority of the other Courts of Appeal even after the Fourth Circuit's 1994 rejection 
of the catalyst theory in S-1 and S-2. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 627 n. 5 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
115. See e.g. J.C., 29 F.3d 119. 
116. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992). 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 111-112. 
119. Id. at 113. 
120. Id. at 103. 
121. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). 
122. S-1 & S-2, 21 F.3d 49. 
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the North Carolina State Board of Education and the chairman 
of the State Board. After the parents and the local board, but 
not the state board or its chairman, entered into a settlement 
agreement, the Fourth Circuit judges dismissed the parents' 
ongoing case against the State Board and its chairman as moot 
because the settlement agreement provided the reimbursement 
the parents were seeking.l23 The remaining issue was whether 
the parents were entitled to any attorneys' fees from the state 
defendants. 124 The Fourth Circuit, sitting en bane, relied on 
the definitions of prevailing party in Farrar to hold that the 
parents had no claim for attorneys' fees against the state 
defendants for their Section 1983 claims. 125 Until Buckhannon, 
however, the Fourth Circuit was alone in interpreting Farrar 
as rejecting the catalyst theory; nine other circuits had 
affirmed the viability of the catalyst theory after the decision in 
Farrar. 126 
In Buckhannon, the Buckhannon Corporation operated the 
Buckhannon Home, an assisted-living facility in West 
Virginia. 127 A State fire marshal sought to enforce West 
Virginia fire regulations that required residents of the home to 
be capable of moving themselves from situations of imminent 
danger such as fire-a so-called "self-preservation" 
requirement. 128 In October 1997, the Buckhannon Corporation 
filed a class action suit against the State of West Virginia, two 
of its agencies and eighteen individuals seeking declaratory 
and injunctive relief that the "self-preservation" requirement 
violated the Fair Housing Amendments Act (FHAA)129 and the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). 130 The Buckhannon 
Corporation filed the suit in response to an order to close the 
Buckhannon home.131 In 1998, before the case came to 
judgment, the West Virginia legislature enacted laws 
eliminating the "self-preservation" regulations in controversy 
123. !d. at 50 
124. !d. at 50-51. 
125. !d. at 51. 
126. See supra n. 114. 
127. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 600. 
128. !d. 
129. !d.; The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 
1619 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.). 
130. !d.; The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 
Stat. 32 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.). 
131. !d. at 600-601. 
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rendering the case moot. 132 The Buckhannon Corporation 
moved for an award of attorneys' fees based on the fee-shifting 
provisions of the FHAA and the ADA according to the catalyst 
theory.l33 Both the FHAA and ADA provide for reimbursement 
of attorneys' fees for prevailing plaintiffs. Since the Fourth 
Circuit had rejected the catalyst theory in S-1 and S-2, the 
District Court denied the motion and the Circuit Court 
affirmed. 134 
In Buckhannon, the majority began its reasoning by 
examining Black's Law Dictionary for the definition of 
"prevailing party."135 According to Black's, the legal definition 
of "prevailing party" was "[a] party in whose favor a judgment 
is rendered .... "136 The Court reasoned that this dictionary 
definition indicated the need for a judicial imprimatur of some 
sort before a party could "prevaiL" After examining the 
legislative reports accompanying the Civil Rights Attorney's 
Fees Awards Act, the Court decided that the legislative history 
surrounding attorney fee-shifting provisions was ambiguous as 
to congressional support of a catalyst theory.l 37 The Court then 
reasoned that, in light of the traditional "American Rule," 
attorneys' fees will not be awarded absent "explicit statutory 
authority."138 This ambiguous legislative history did not 
support a catalyst theory. 139 The Court also acknowledged 
various policy issues surrounding its decision, including 
whether "mischievous defendants" would or could now 
unilaterally moot actions to avoid paying attorneys' fees for 
prevailing plaintiffs. 140 The majority believed that it need not 
weigh these issues fully, however.l 41 Instead, the majority 
relied on Black's definition of "prevailing party" to reject the 
132. Id. at 601 
133. Id. 
134. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dept. of Health and Human 
Resources, 203 F.3d 819 (Table of Unreported Decisions) (4th Cir. 2000). 
135. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603. 
136. Id. (citations omitted). 
137. Id. at 607. Despite the majority's recognition that its holding would be widely 
applied, see supra n. 8, no citation to the legislative history of any statute other than § 
1983 appears in the Buckhannon decision. So, for example, no reference is made to the 
legislative history of the fee-shifting provisions of the IDEA, which includes reference 
to defining "prevailing party" as in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983). 
138. Id. at 608 
139. Id. 
140. Id. at 608-09. 
141. Id. at 609. 
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catalyst theory. 142 As the Court stated, "[g]iven the clear 
meaning of 'prevailing party,' we need not determine which 
way these various policy arguments cut."143 
B. Interpreting Buckhannon 
The unweighed policy issues alluded to in Buckhannon 
have come to vex many plaintiffs seeking to enforce their right 
to a F APE under the IDEA. Courts implementing Buckhannon 
have begun denying plaintiffs reimbursement for their 
attorneys' fees even when the plaintiffs have brought 
meritorious claims and forced the opposing party to change its 
position. In J.S. and M.S. v. Ramapo Central School District, 144 
for example, M.S., mother of J.S., a teen with a learning 
disability, sought reimbursement from the defendant school 
district for a one-year residential placement of J.S. at a private 
school. 145 The matter went to hearing and the hearing officer 
142. The majority's decision in Buckhannon exemplifies the Court's trend toward 
greater use of dictionaries in their decision making. Empirical research on the use of 
dictionaries in Supreme Court jurisprudence indicates that in the 1992 term, the 
Supreme Court had a fourteen-fold increase in citations to dictionary definitions 
compared with the 1981 term. Student Author, Looking It Up: Dictionaries and 
Statutory Interpretation, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1437, 1440 (1994). Overall, the Court's use 
of legal dictionaries as ultimate authorities in decision making reflects the current 
majority's preference for textualist methods of statutory interpretation. Some observers 
have criticized Buckhannon and its use of Black's Law Dictionary as reflecting a form 
of hypertextualism that promotes a myth of precision in judicial decision making. 
Aviam Soifer, Courting Anarchy, 82 B. U. L. Rev. 699, 726 (2002) (citing Ellen P. Aprill, 
The Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme Court, 30 Ariz. St. L. J. 275 
(1998) (citing David Mellinkoff, The Myth of Precision and the Law Dictionary, 31 
UCLA L. Rev. 23 (1983); Richard J. Pierce, Jr. The Supreme Court's New 
Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative 
State, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 749 (1995))). Soifer notes, in reaction to the Buckhannon 
reliance on Black's Law Dictionary for the definitive definition of "prevailing party," 
that "Black's Law Dictionary trumps the Court's own recent dicta, the view of all the 
circuit courts except the Fourth Circuit, the statutory civil rights context, and multiple 
precedents stretching back into the nineteenth century and carefully marshaled in 
Justice Ginsburg's dissent." Soifer, supra, at 726. All these secondary sources cite and 
defer to the remarkably succinct assessment of Judge Learned Hand in warning of the 
dangers of slavish textualism: "But it is one of the surest indexes of a mature and 
developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember 
that statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic 
and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning." Cabell v. Markham, 
148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945). For arguments in support of textualism as opposed to 
a legislative history approach to statutory interpretation, see William W. Buzbee, The 
One-Congress Fiction In Statutory Interpretation, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 171 (2000). 
143. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 610. 
144. .J.S. & M.S. v. Ramapo C. Sch. Dist., 165 F. Supp. 2d 570 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
145. ld. at 572-73. 
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received some evidence over three days. 146 The school district 
then agreed to M.S.'s demands and the case was settled. 147 
Neither party sought to have the settlement read into the 
record or affirmed in any way by the hearing officer. 148 
Applying Buckhannon retroactively, the Southern District of 
New York denied the plaintiff prevailing party status and, 
therefore, any prospect of fee or cost reimbursement under the 
IDEA The District Court relied on Buckhannon's requirement 
that any resolution of a case involve some form of judicial 
imprimatur before a party may "prevail.'' Citing Buckhannon, 
the District Court stated that "(p]rivate settlement agreements 
do not confer prevailing party status.''149 
There is no evidence that the school district in J.S. mooted 
the issues for the purpose of avoiding payment of J.S.'s 
attorney's fees, but the case history provides a blueprint for 
other defendants to use when it appears that they may not win 
their case. This approach could be especially effective when 
the issues involved concern equitable remedies and the state in 
question is one in which hearing officers may not render 
settlement agreements as orders or decisions unless both 
parties consent. 150 
The school district in J.C. v. Board of Education, 151 
discussed in the Introduction, followed the J.S. blueprint by 
refusing to cooperate to make the settlement an official order. 
Together, J.S. and J.C. illustrate the pitfalls awaiting plaintiffs 
146. Id. at 576. 
147. ld. at 573. 
148. Chronologically the case was settled before the Supreme Court's decision in 
Buckhannon. 
149. J.S. & M.S., 165 F. Supp. 2d at 575 (citing Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604 n. 7, 
where the Supreme Court wrote, "Private settlements do not entail the judicial 
approval and oversight involved in consent decrees. And federal jurisdiction to enforce 
a private contractual settlement will often be lacking unless the terms of the 
agreement are incorporated into the order of dismissal."). 
150. In Connecticut, it is not clear if under the state's law applicable in J.C., 
whether a settlement agreement may be recorded as a hearing officer's final decision or 
order even with the parties' consent. The applicable Connecticut regulation cited by the 
hearing officer in J.C. reads, "A settlement agreement shall not constitute a final 
decision, prescription or order of the hearing officer. The settlement agreement may be 
read into the record as an agreement between the parties only." Conn. Agencies Regs. 
§ 10-76h-16(d). Contrast California, where the relevant code reads, "[n]otwithstanding 
Government Code section 11415.60 of the Administrative Procedure Act, a decision by 
settlement may be issued on terms the parties determine are appropriate so long as the 
agreed-upon terms are not contrary to the law." Cal. Code of Regs. Tit. 5, § 3087 (2003). 
151. J.C., 278 F.3d 119. 
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who settle and would be considered prevailing parties under 
the catalyst theory. 
Even when private settlement agreements become part of 
the official record, parents may be denied prevailing party 
status under Buckhannon. In Louis R. v. Joliet Township High 
School District, 152 "plaintiffs contend[ed that] the mediation 
agreement read into the record before a hearing officer should 
be construed as a consent decree for purposes of assessing 
prevailing party status" under the Buckhannon regime. 153 The 
plaintiff was seeking to have the agreement entered as an 
order as a means of ensuring that the agreement would be 
enforceable. 154 The defendants argued that the agreement was 
a private settlement not a consent decree because the hearing 
officer did not make any findings or deliver a ruling. 155 Relying 
on the definition of consent decree provided by Barron's Law 
Dictionary, 156 the District Court rejected the plaintiffs 
characterization of the mediation agreement, 157 and held that 
without the Hearing Officer's explicit approval, entering the 
agreement into the record did not convert the agreement into a 
consent decree. Accordingly, plaintiffs were not entitled to 
"prevailing party" status under Buckhannon and could not 
invoke the attorney fee-shifting provisions of the IDEA.158 
C. The Impact of Buckhannon 
J.S., J.C., and Louis R. all strictly apply Buckhannon 
illustrating how Buckhannon's holding undermines Congress' 
intent to promote early resolution of IDEA disputes. 159 The 
IDEA is designed for school personnel and parents to work 
152. Luis R., v. Joliet Township High Sch. Dist., 2002 WL 54544 (N.D. Ill. 2002). 
153. Id. at 3. 
154. Id. 
155. Id.; see also supra n. 150. 
156. Id. (citing Steven H. Gifis, Barron's Law Dictionary 97 (4th ed., Barron's 
Educ. Series, Inc. 1996) (emphasis added) (A consent decree is "a contract of the parties 
entered upon the record with the approval and sanction of a court of competent 
jurisdiction, which cannot be set aside without the consent of the parties .... "). See 
also supra n. 142. 
157. For sources discussing the role of legal dictionaries in judicial decision-
making, see supra n. 142. 
158. Luis R., 2002 WL 54544 at 3. This District Court also cited to Buckhannon, 
532 U.S. at 603 n. 7 ("Private settlement agreements do not entail the judicial approval 
and oversight involved in consent decrees."). 
159. Sen. Rpt. 105-17, at 26-27 (May 9, 1997). 
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together to determine the appropriate education for a given 
disabled child. 160 Indeed, this is a purpose of both the IEP 
requirement and the opportunity for early resolution of 
disputes through mediation.161 If parents and school personnel 
cannot agree in the IEP meeting, the parties generally proceed 
to mediation where a third party neutral controls the process 
and assists parties in coming to an agreement. Attorneys can 
represent both parties in mediation. 162 Before Buckhannon, in 
those cases in which the mediation resulted in an agreement as 
to the appropriate educational plan for the disabled child, the 
parties entered into a settlement agreement. If the agreement 
provided the parents substantially all of the relief they were 
seeking, the parents' attorney could seek reasonable fees from 
the school district after the mediation. In this situation, 
parents would be the prevailing party under the catalyst 
theory, and the school district would be responsible for the 
parents' reasonable attorneys' fees. 163 Importantly, and as the 
IDEA intended, the focus of the mediation was the disabled 
child's unique needs and the educational plan designed to meet 
those needs. 
As an example, a typical dispute may involve the quantity 
of a related service such as speech therapy. Hypothetically, the 
160. ld. at 25 (May 9, 1997); see also Philip T.K. Daniel, Education for Students 
with Special Needs: The Judicially Defined Role of the Parents in the Process, 29 J. L. & 
Educ. 1 (2000). 
161. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e). 
162. Per federal law, states offer mediation as preliminary to the due process 
hearing and with adherence to the due process hearing timeline requirements. (For 
example, a decision must be rendered within 45 days of a party filing for a due process 
hearing. 34 C.F.R. § 300.511 (1999).) As with due process hearings, parties have a 
right to attorney representation at these mediations. 34 C.F.R. § 300.509(a)(l) (1999). 
Federal law neither prohibits nor requires attorney representation during mediation. 
See Sen. Rpt. 105-17, 26 (May 9, 1997). Some states offer mediation without any 
requirement that a party file for a hearing. In this type of mediation, some states 
prohibit attorney representation. For example in California, "[i]t is the intent of the 
Legislature that parties to special education disputes be encouraged to seek resolution 
through mediation prior to filing a request for a due process 
hearing ... attorneys ... shall not attend or otherwise participate in the prehearing 
request mediation conferences." Cal. Code of Educ. § 56500.3(a) (2003). There are no 
public data on how many parents participate in these prehearing request mediation 
conferences. However, a proposed bill, Cal. Assembly 164, 2001-2002 Reg. Sess. (Jan. 
31, 2001), to compel parents to attend information sessions explaining the advantages 
of these mediation sessions was recently proposed. Perhaps because there is concern 
that time devoted to prehearing mediation may delay enforcement of due process 
rights, the bill has been on inactive status for some time. 
163. See e.g. E.M., 849 F. Supp. 312. 
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school district's speech therapist may believe that twenty 
minutes of individual speech therapy per week is the 
appropriate amount of therapy. The parents may obtain an 
independent evaluation by an outside speech therapist 
indicating that the child requires two hours per week of speech 
therapy. If the amount of speech therapy the child should 
receive cannot be resolved in the IEP meeting, the parents may 
request a due process hearing to resolve the matter. Before the 
hearing there may be a voluntary mediation. 164 
In the mediation, if the parties hypothetically agreed that 
forty minutes of individual speech therapy per week and forty-
minutes of group speech therapy per week would be reasonably 
calculated to help the child achieve his IEP goals, then the 
parties would enter into a settlement agreement. In this 
example, pre-Buckhannon, the mediation need not have 
considered the issue of the plaintiffs attorneys' fees because in 
most jurisdictions, these fees would have been available under 
the catalyst theory.l65 Under Buckhannon, if the plaintiffs 
attorneys' fees are not made part of the formal mediation 
agreement, it is unlikely that the plaintiff would obtain them 
under the fee-shifting provisions of the IDEA as now 
interpreted. There would be a private settlement agreement 
without judicial imprimatur, and as per the case of J.S., the 
plaintiffs would not be the "prevailing party," even though they 
had substantially achieved the relief they were seeking.166 
In this hypothetical, the annual monetary value of the 
incremental increase in speech therapy would be $2,500. 167 
The cost of the independent speech evaluation, the attorney's 
preparation time, and the attorney's mediation time could 
easily exceed this amount. Thus, the parents would have 
incurred substantial financial risk in seeking to ensure that 
164. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e). 
165. See supra n. 114. 
166. J.S., 165 F. Supp. 2d 570. 
167. Typical fees for speech therapists in an urban area are about $90 per hour for 
individual therapy, $45 per hour for group therapy. See Am. Speech-Language-
Hearing Assn., 2002 Medicare Physician Fee Schedule for Speech-Language Specialists 
and Audiologists <http://professional.asha.org/resources/reimbursement> (accessed 
Jan. 14, 2003). In this example, the school district's initial offer of twenty minutes per 
week individual therapy would have an estimated annual monetary value of $30 X 42 
weeks (per school year) = $1,260. The hypothetical settlement provided for forty 
minutes of individual therapy and forty minutes of group therapy per week. The 
annual monetary value of that therapy would be ($60 x 42) + ($30 x 42) = $3,780. The 
incremental increase would then be $3,780 - $1,260 = $2,520. 
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their child received the amount of speech therapy that was 
appropriate for his needs. 
The lesson is clear: after Buckhannon, plaintiffs must 
either make the matter of attorneys' fees a negotiating issue in 
the settlement discussions or choose to appear pro se at the 
mediation where the school district may be represented by an 
attorney well-versed in the intricacies of special education law. 
Under Buckhannon, parents and school districts may find that 
the mediation process is degenerating into a bargaining session 
where the parties trade pieces of a child's educational program 
for reimbursement of attorneys' fees. In addition, since 
attorneys' fees are usually significant relative costs, the change 
in the dynamics of mediation under the Buckhannon regime 
dramatically shifts the power balance in favor of the defendant. 
Represented parents whose school districts refuse to include 
their attorneys' fees in a negotiated settlement have an 
incentive to proceed to hearing so as to attain prevailing party 
status. Unfortunately, the risks for such parents are great. 
They may lose at hearing, but even if they win, the relief they 
are awarded may be substantially the same relief they were 
offered in the mediation. If this occurs, there is current 
statutory language in the IDEA that may deny them attorneys' 
fees despite their prevailing party status. 168 These changes 
defeat the intent of the IDEA in two ways: first, they 
discourage parents from initiating disputes to obtain a F APE 
for their child; and second, they encourage parents who do 
initiate such suits to prolong them to achieve prevailing party 
status. The intent of the IDEA to have all parties focused on 
the best interests of the child is easily lost under these new 
dynamics. 
168. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(i) (1997) reads as follows: 
Attorneys' fees may not be awarded and related costs may not be reimbursed 
in any action or proceeding under this section for services performed 
subsequent to the time of a written offer of settlement to a parent if~ 
(I) the offer is made within the time prescribed by Rule 68 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure or, in the case of an administrative proceeding, at 
any time more than 10 days before the proceeding begins; 
(II) the offer is not accepted within 10 days; and 
(III) the court or administrative hearing officer finds that the relief fmally 
obtained by the parents is not more favorable to the parents than the offer of 
settlement. 
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The IDEA promoted procedure over substance in its effort 
to guarantee disabled children a F APE. In Rowley, the 
Supreme Court accepted this ascendance of procedure over 
substance because the Court recognized that the substance of a 
unique disabled child's education was not a matter for the 
federal courts ultimately to decide.l69 The Court also relied on 
parents acting as private attorney generals in enforcing the 
IDEA, as Congress intended.l70 Writing for the Court in 
Rowley, Justice Rehnquist noted that "[a]s this very case 
demonstrates, parents and guardians will not lack ardor in 
seeking to ensure that handicapped children receive all of the 
benefits to which they are entitled by the Act."171 Congress, 
through its attorney fee-shifting legislation and provisions, 
sought to buttress this parental ardor. Unfortunately, 
Buckhannon has dramatically limited the ability of parents to 
privately enforce the IDEA. Now parents may have plenty of 
ardor, but lack the funds to pursue their child's educational 
entitlements. Ardor in the face of large attorneys' bills is 
naturally tempered. 
After Buckhannon, for parents to assert their disabled 
child's right to a FAPE, they must risk the possibility of the 
defense rendering their case moot. Becoming the prevailing 
party by obtaining judicially sanctioned relief is the only 
guarantee to parents that they will not be liable for attorneys' 
fees in excess of the value of the relief they receive. Yet 
whether parents obtain the necessary judicial imprimatur 
depends, in large part, on the willingness of defendants to 
contest matters through judgment. Defendants may 
unilaterally grant relief well into hearings, leaving parents 
holding the bag for their own attorneys' fees. In Buckhannon, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote, "[a]nd petitioners' fear of 
mischievous defendants only materializes in claims for 
equitable relief, for so long as the plaintiff has a cause of action 
for damages, a defendant's change in conduct will not moot the 
case." 172 IDEA claims are just the sort of claims for equitable 
169. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 208. 
170. The Senate Report accompanying the 1997 reauthorization of the IDEA, for 
example, notes: "The procedural safeguards in the IDEA have historically provided the 
foundation for ensuring access to a free appropriate public education for children with 
disabilities." Sen. Rpt. 105-17, at 25 (May 9, 1997). 
171. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 209. 
172. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 608-09. 
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relief to which he alludes. Compensatory money damages are 
never available under the IDEA; at most, compensatory 
education is the remedy available for school district 
misconduct. 173 Under IDEA, pursuit of prospective, equitable 
relief is available, encouraged, and often sought either alone or 
along with retrospective claims. The procedural safeguards of 
IDEA supported by state-imposed statutes of limitation 
encourage speedy resolution of disputes. 174 In addition, there is 
consensus that early intervention is often a key to success in 
educating disabled children. 175 These factors lead to claims 
that are relatively small in total value. Thus, in IDEA claims, 
the attorneys' fees can easily surpass the value of any relief 
obtained. With the mooting that Buckhannon encourages, 
parents are at greater financial risk. 
Parents, nevertheless, often need attorneys to assert their 
disabled children's rights to a FAPE. Although parents are 
allowed to represent their own children pro se in 
administrative hearings and no attorney is necessary to use a 
state's complaint resolution procedures, many factors 
discourage parents from acting on their own behalf in these 
proceedings. Despite being called "administrative hearings" or 
"complaints," these proceedings require fluency in English, an 
ability to understand detailed state and federal statutes, and 
an ability to present a case with evidence, witnesses, legal 
motions, and briefs before a hearing officer who will adhere to 
the evidentiary and procedural standards appropriate to 
litigation in federal courts. Educational and time limitations 
make it impossible for the vast majority of parents to proceed 
with these mechanisms without the aid of an advocate or 
attorney. The situation in federal courts is even more difficult. 
Federal judges largely have banned non-attorney parents from 
representing their children in their courts. 176 So, regardless of 
173. See e.g. Witte, 197 F.3d at 1275 ("Although the IDEA allows courts to grant 
'such relief as the court determines is appropriate,' 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B)(iii), 
ordinarily monetary damages are not available under that statute."). 
174. See e.g. Cal. Educ. Code § 56505(j) (2003), which provides that "[a]ny request 
for a due process hearing ... shall be filed within three years from the date the party 
initiating the request knew or had reason to know of the facts underlying the basis for 
the request." 
175. Amanda J. v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 267 F.3d 877 (9th Cir. 2001). 
176. Collinsgru v. Bd. of Educ., 161 F.3d 225 (3rd Cir. 1998). See also Devine v. 
Indian River County Sch. Bd., 121 F.3d 176 (11th Cir. 1997); ,Johns v. County of San 
Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 876-877 (9th Cir. 1997); Cheung v. Youth Orchestra Found., 906 
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the size of the claim, parents must have attorneys to pursue 
their claims in federal courts. Under the Buckhannon regime 
then, parents pursuing IDEA claims in federal court risk 
defense rendering their cases moot up until the eve of 
judgment, and since parents are banned from representing 
their children in federal courts, Buckhannon has dramatically 
increased the financial risks to parents. Parents must now 
choose between assuming these daunting risks and not 
asserting their child's rights to a FAPE. 
Equal protection for disabled children will suffer as parents 
do their own cost-benefit analysis. The result will be the cost to 
society of less-educated, disabled citizens who have diminished 
chances for self-sufficiency. This was not the intent of 
Congress. When the earlier Supreme Court decision in Smith 
made attorneys' fees unavailable to parents, Congress passed 
the Handicapped Children's Protection Act. In the report 
accompanying that Act, the Senate wrote, "Congress' original 
intent was that due process procedures, including the right to 
litigation if that became necessary, be available to all 
parents." 177 After Buckhannon, the greater risk to parents of 
non-recovery of attorneys' fees makes this egalitarian intent 
even less realistic. 
V. POTENTIAL REMEDIES TO THE BUCKHANNON PROBLEM IN 
IDEA LITIGATION 
A. Court-Based Remedies 
The lower federal courts, through their interpretive 
discretion, offer a potential means of restoring the pre-
Buckhannon fee-shifting provisions of the IDEA. The 
incentives of those provisiOns more closely track the 
congressional intent of contributing to the active and 
egalitarian enforcement of the Act. This process seems to be 
under way, in part, as the lower federal courts have not 
uniformly applied the broad Buckhannon holding. For 
example, two circuits have relaxed their interpretations of 
prevailing party status despite Buckhannon's judicial 
imprimatur requirement. In John and Leigh T. v. Iowa 
F.2d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 1990); Meeker v. Kercher, 782 F.2d 153, 154 (lOth Cir. 1986). 
177. Sen. Rpt. 99-112, at 2 (July 25, 1985). 
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Department of Education, 178 the Eighth Circuit held the Iowa 
Department of Education responsible for attorneys' fees even 
though the plaintiffs had been adjudicated prevailing parties 
only in their action against the local school district, not in their 
action against the state department. 179 On appeal, the 
plaintiffs had joined the state department of education as 
defendants. 180 The Eighth Circuit reasoned that, although the 
plaintiffs prevailed against the local school district, the state 
department of education should bear responsibility for some of 
the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees. 181 This is because the state 
department had direct authority over and had assisted the 
local school district in vigorously defending the case .182 
In Barrios v. California Interscholastic Federation, a panel 
of the Ninth Circuit held that it was not bound by the "dictum 
in Buckhannon [that] suggests that a plaintiff 'prevails' only 
when he or she receives a favorable judgment on the merits or 
enters into a court supervised consent decree .... "183 This 
"dictum" was precisely the "authority" that the Southern 
District of New York and Northern District of Illinois had 
relied upon in deciding the J.S. and Louis R. cases. 184 
Victor Barrios was a paraplegic high school baseball coach 
whom the California Interscholastic Federation (CJF) had 
randomly prohibited from using his athletic wheelchair when 
doing on-field coaching. 185 He filed suit under the ADA seeking 
compensatory damages and injunctive relief. 186 He and CIF 
reached a settlement agreement in which he received $10,000 
in damages and a commitment to allow him to coach his team 
from his wheelchair during games.l87 The Ninth Circuit found 
that Barrios qualified as a "prevailing party" under the ADA 
fee-shifting provisions, even without a judicial imprimatur of 
the settlement, because Barrios received the relief he sought, 
178. 258 F. 3d 860 (8th Cir. 2001). 
179. Id. at 862. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. at 865. 
183. Barrios v. Cal. Interscholastic Fedn., 277 F.3d 1128, 1134 n. 5 (9th Cir. 2002), 
cert. denied, Cal. Interscholastic Fedn v. Barrios, 123 S. Ct. 98 (2002) (citing 
Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603 n. 7). 
184. J. S., 165 F. Supp. 2d 570; Luis R., 2002 WL 54544 (N.D. Ill. 2002). 
185. Barrios, 277 F.3d at 1130. 
186. Id. at 1132. 
187. Id. at 1133. 
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the relief was memorialized in an enforceable settlement 
agreement, and that relief was not de minimus. 188 The Ninth 
Circuit reasoned that it was bound not by the dicta in 
Buckhannon, but by its own holding in Fischer v. SJB-P.D. 
Jnc. 189 that a plaintiff also "prevails" when he or she enters into 
a legally enforceable settlement agreement against the 
defendant. 190 
In Ostby v. Oxnard Union High, 191 the Central District 
Court of California also chose not to follow the broader 
interpretation of Buckhannon. Instead, the court chose to 
apply the Barrios holding. The plaintiffs in Ostby were the 
parents of Elise Ostby, a teenager with Asperger's Syndrome (a 
form of autism) and other related disabilities. 192 They filed for 
a due process hearing seeking retroactive reimbursement and 
prospective payment of a residential placement that the 
parents had unilaterally chosen for Elise after they had gone 
through a protracted period of frustration securing appropriate 
services from the defendant high school district. 193 In 
mediation, the parties had reached an agreement that gave the 
parents all of the relief they were seeking, including the 
defendant's commitment to pay for Elise's placement in the 
future. 194 The mediation agreement "was in writing, was 
signed by the parties and by the mediation officer assigned to 
the case and was filed with the [California] Special Education 
Hearing Office." 195 The district court held that this agreement, 
even though it did not have a judicial imprimatur, gave the 
parents "prevailing party" status for purposes of the IDEA 
attorney fee-shifting provisions. 196 Ostby was the first IDEA 
188. Id. 
189. Fischer v. SJB-P.D. Inc., 214 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2000). 
190. Fisher, 214 F.3d at 1118 (quoting Farrar, 506 U.S. at 111-112, 113), "[A] 
plaintiff 'prevails' when actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters the 
legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way 
that directly benefits the plaintiff." The Court explained that "[n]o material alteration 
of the legal relationship occurs the plaintiff becomes entitled to enforce a judgment, 
consent decree, or settlement against the defendant." In these situations, the legal 
relationship is altered because the plaintiff can force the defendant to do something he 
otherwise would not have to do.) 
191. Ostby v. Oxnard Union High, 209 F. Supp. 2d. 1035 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
192. Id. at 1036. 
193. ld. 
194. ld. at 1037. 
195. Id. 
196. ld. at 1042. 
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case within the Ninth Circuit to apply the Barrios holding. The 
District Court noted that the Ninth Circuit's holding in Barrios 
and the Second Circuit's holding in the J.C. case represent 
conflicting applications of Buckhannon. 197 "Thus, in the Ninth 
Circuit, unlike in the Second Circuit, a plaintiff who obtains a 
private settlement against a defendant is a 'prevailing party' 
for purposes of federal fee-shifting statutes."198 
In the Northern District of Illinois, one court has found that 
the Buckhannon holding does not apply to the IDEA. In TD u. 
La Grange School District, Judge Zagel concluded: 
. . . I believe there exist critical distinctions in the text 
and structure of the IDEA and the ADA and FHAA that 
persuade me that the Court's ruling in Buckhannon was 
not meant to extend to the IDEA and, accordingly, does 
not control the interpretation of the term "prevailing 
party" in the attorneys' fees provision of the IDEA. 199 
To reach this conclusion, the TD court reasoned from the 
Seventh Circuit's opinion in Crabill u. Trans Union L.L.C.200 in 
which the court undertook a comparison of the text, structure, 
and legislative history of the attorney fee-shifting provisions of 
the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) with the fee-shifting 
provisions under consideration in Buckhannon. The Crabill 
court concluded: "We cannot find anything in the text, 
structure, or legislative history of the [Fair Credit Reporting] 
Act to suggest that its attorneys' fee provision has a different 
meaning from the provision at issue in Buckhannon."201 
Therefore, in Crabill, the Seventh Circuit held that the 
Buckhannon holding applied to the FCRA. 
Applying the methodology of the Crabill court, the district 
court in TD found material differences between the attorneys' 
fee provision of the IDEA and the statutes under consideration 
in Buckhannon. Since the IDEA specifically mentioned 
settlement as a basis for the awarding of attorneys' fees to 
parents and the IDEA specifically delineated certain instances, 
not including settlement agreements, when attorneys' fees 
197. Id. at 1041. 
198. Id. at 1041 (citing Barrios, 277 F.3d at 1134; Johnson v. D.C., 190 F. Supp. 2d 
34, 44 (D.D.C. 2002)). 
199. TD v. La Grange Sch. Dist. No. 102, 222 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1065 (N.D. Ill. 
2002). 
200. Crabill v. Trans Union, L.L.C., 259 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2001). 
201. Id. at 667. 
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would be prohibited, the TD court found settlement agreements 
to be eligible for an award of fees. 202 Notably, the TD court's 
ruling is in direct disagreement with its sister court in Louis R. 
Barrios and Ostby indicate that in the Ninth Circuit 
plaintiffs in certain actions, including IDEA actions, may still 
obtain prevailing party status through private settlement 
agreements. TD seems to follow this development. This trend 
may continue as more courts apply Buckhannon. 
In some jurisdictions, plaintiffs may circumvent the 
Buckhannon problem through a temporary restraining order 
(TRO). In Johnny's Icehouse, Inc., v. Amateur Hockey 
Association of Illinois, a Title IX action, the plaintiff sought a 
TR0.203 Since there were findings of fact by the court in 
granting the TRO, the court later held that the TRO was 
sufficient to deem the plaintiff a "prevailing party" under the 
Buckhannon regime, even when the defendant provided relief 
before the matter was finally adjudicated.204 The court 
determined that the TRO served as a court-approved finding of 
fact on the merits of plaintiffs case, namely a form of judicial 
imprimatur. Perhaps the success of this argument in Johnny's 
Icehouse may cause plaintiffs in special education litigation to 
seek temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions. 
However, the so-called "stay-put" provisions of the IDEA and 
the education statutes of the several states make injunctions 
based on findings of fact more difficult to obtain. 205 
202. Judge Zagel noted that 
[u]nlike the ADA or the FHAA, the IDEA specifically addresses settlement as 
a basis for the award of attorneys' fees. For example, the IDEA specifically 
provides for a reduction in recoverable fees when parents reject timely, 
reasonable settlement offers. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D). Moreover, the IDEA 
provides that parents may be awarded attorneys' fees when they are the 
prevailing party 'in any action or proceeding brought under this section,' 
including, under certain circumstances, 'for a mediation described in 
subsection (e) of this section that is conducted prior to the filing of a 
complaint.' 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(ii). Finally, because Congress specifically 
delineated certain instances when attorneys' fees are prohibited under IDEA, 
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(ii), but did not exclude settlement agreements from 
being eligible for the award of attorneys' fees, settlement agreements are 
presumptively eligible for such an award of attorneys' fees. 
TD, 122 F. Supp. 2d. at 1063. 
203. 2001 WL 893840 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 2001). 
204. Id. at 3. 
205. As part of the procedural safeguards of the IDEA, there is a so-called "stay-
put" provision that maintains a student's current educational placement during the 
pendency of a due process hearing. "During the pendency of any proceedings conducted 
pursuant to this section, unless the State or local educational agency and the parents 
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Despite a few divergent opmwns, and the long-shot 
potential of the preliminary injunction, the strong trend 
appears to be for courts to follow Buckhannon's narrow 
definition of prevailing party.206 To preserve the private cause 
of action as a means of enforcing the IDEA, Congress must act 
to restore some form of the catalyst theory in the attorney fee-
shifting provisions of the Act. 
B. The Need for a Congressional Remedy 
As demonstrated above, the Buckhannon decision has 
created a problem for civil rights' plaintiffs. With regard to the 
IDEA, Congress can solve the problem created by Buckhannon 
quite readily. Congress intervened when, in its 1984 Smith 
decision, the Supreme Court held that civil rights laws and the 
rehabilitation act did not apply to handicapped children. 
Congress can intervene again post-Buckhannon to protect the 
rights of disabled children. 
In the area of special education, all involved, whether 
federal courts, state officials, local school personnel, or parents, 
have an obligation to place the interests of the disabled child 
above all other interests. As demonstrated above, Buckhannon 
significantly impairs parties' abilities to share this overarching 
goal. Rules like the one from Buckhannon that encourage 
school districts to save funds by tactically "sticking" parents 
with attorneys' fees will inevitably distract from the 
preeminence of the child's interests. Parents, now facing much 
otherwise agree, the child shall remain in the then-current educational placement of 
such child .... " 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j). Most states have similar statutory provisions for 
their due process hearings. See e.g. CaL Educ. Code § 56505(d). The stay-put provisions 
are a form of preliminary injunction, and the federal stay-put provision "substitutes an 
absolute rule in favor of the status quo for the court's discretionary consideration of the 
factors of irreparable harm and either a likelihood of success on the merits or a fair 
ground for litigation and a balance of the hardships." Zvi D. v. Ambach, 694 F.2d 904, 
906 (2d Cir. 1982) (quoted in Johnson v. Spec. Educ. Hearing Off, St. of Cal., 387 F.3d 
1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also Drinker v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 78 F.3d 859 (3d Cir. 
1996); Bd. of Educ. of Community High Sch. Dist. No. 218, Cook County v. Ill. St. Bd. of 
Educ. 103 F.3d 545 (7th Cir. 1996). However, the Ninth Circuit, in Johnson, held that 
a plaintiffs request to enjoin a preexisting stay-put order, viz. one issued under State 
law, would be appropriately handled by a district court using the traditional analysis of 
"(1) a combination of probable success and the possibility of irreparable harm, or (2) 
that serious questions are raised and the balance of hardship tips in (plaintiffs] favor." 
Johnson, 387 F.3d at 1180 (quoting Prudential Real Estate Affiliates, Inc. v. PPR 
Realty Inc., 204 F.3d 867, 874 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
206. Ronald D. Wenkart, Attorneys Fees Under the IDEA and the Demise of the 
Catalyst Theory, 165 Educ. L. Rep. 2 (2002). 
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greater financial risk if they seek to ensure their disabled 
child's appropriate education through the IDEA procedural 
safeguards, naturally will be deterred. The detriment is to the 
disabled child, and ultimately to the society that must provide 
for those disabled individuals who are less capable of self-
sufficiency in adulthood. 207 
Certain provisions of the IDEA that are currently in place 
could forestall some of the unintended negative outcomes 
Buckhannon has engendered. For example, the IDEA allows 
courts to penalize defendants who would "unilaterally moot an 
action before judgment in an effort to avoid an award of 
attorney's fees."208 This is not a good solution, however, 
because it contravenes another oft-repeated Supreme Court 
207. Even before Buckhannon, the special education defense bar bemoaned the 
ascendancy of tactics over merit in resolving disputes concerning appropriate education 
for disabled children. A typical defense criticism of procedural safeguards of the IDEA 
has been that " ... the threat of losing at a due process hearing and needing to 
reimburse the parents for attorneys' fees in addition to the cost for services encourages 
school districts to settle many cases. In fact, even cases with questionable merit are 
often settled because a cost-benefit analysis does not warrant spending public funds 
and dedicating the administrative time necessary to litigate." Bridget A. Flanagan & 
Chad J. Graff, Federal Mandate to Educate Disabled Students Doesn't Cover Costs. 47 
Fed. Law. 22, 27 (Sept. 2000). Ironically, Buckhannon now has made the stakes even 
higher for school districts, as the incentive has shifted for parents to seek a judicial 
imprimatur in hearings carried through to judgment to ensure their reimbursement of 
attorneys' fees. 
208. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 608. In the IDEA there is an exception to reduction 
of [plaintiffs'] attorneys' fee award: "The provisions of subparagraph (F) shall not apply 
in any action or proceeding if the court finds that the State or local educational agency 
unreasonably protracted the final resolution of the action or proceeding or there was a 
violation of this section." 20 U.S.C. § 14l5(i)(3)(G) (1997). 
Subparagraph (F) Reduction in amount of attorneys' fees reads as follows: 
Except as provided in subparagraph (G), whenever the court finds that-
(i) the parent, during the course of the action or proceeding, unreasonably 
protracted the final resolution of the controversy; 
(ii) the amount of the attorneys' fees otherwise authorized to be awarded 
unreasonably exceeds the hourly rate prevailing in the community for similar 
services by attorneys of reasonably comparable skill, reputation, and 
experience; 
(iii) the time spent and legal services furnished were excessive considering 
the nature of the action or proceeding; or 
(iv) the attorney representing the parent did not provide to the school district 
the appropriate information in the due process complaint in accordance with 
subsection (b)(7) of this section; 
the court shall reduce, accordingly, the amount of the attorneys' fees awarded 
under this section. 
20 U.S.C. § l415(i)(3)(F) (1997). 
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admonition that fee-shifting provisions should not engender a 
second major litigation.209 
The best solution is congressional revision of the IDEA to 
provide for some form of catalyst theory or a broader definition 
of prevailing party for purposes of the fee-shifting provisions. 210 
Both Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his majority opinion, and 
Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion in Buckhannon, 
suggest that congressional response may well be appropriate in 
light of the Court's holding. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing 
for the majority, expresses discomfort with the judicial 
discretion offered by the catalyst theory: "In Alyeska . .. , we 
said that Congress had not 'extended any roving authority to 
the Judiciary to allow counsel fees as costs or otherwise 
whenever the courts might deem them warranted."'211 In his 
concurring opinion, Justice Scalia acknowledged that Congress 
may wish to act: 
The Court today concludes that a party cannot be 
deemed to have prevailed, for purposes of fee-shifting 
statues such as 42. U.S.C. §§ 1988, 3613(c)(2), unless 
there has been an enforceable "alteration of the legal 
relationship of the parties." That is the normal meaning 
of "prevailing party" in litigation, and there is no proper 
basis for departing from that normal meaning. Congress 
is free, of course, to revise these provisions-but it is my 
guess that if it does so it will not create the sort of 
inequity that the catalyst theory invites, but will 
require the court to determine that there was at least a 
substantial likelihood that the party requesting fees 
would have prevailed. 21 2 
209. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 609 ("We have also stated that '[a] request for 
attorney's fees should not result in a second major litigation,' Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 
U.S. 424, 437, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L. Ed.2d 40 (1983), and have accordingly avoided an 
interpretation of the fee-shifting statutes that would have 'spawn[ed] a second 
litigation of significant dimension,' Garland, 489 U.S. at 791, 109 S.Ct. 1486.") 
210. A congressional overturning of the entire Buckhannon decision would also 
solve the problem. For example, the Vermont Bar Association adopted a resolution in 
September 2001 calling upon the Vermont congressional delegation to "take all steps 
necessary to introduce, support, and enact federal legislation that would overturn the 
Buckhannon decision ... " 0. Whitman Smith, Erosion of Civil Rights Enforcement: 
Judicial Constriction of the Civil Rights and Disability Bar, 28 Vt. B. J. & L. Dig. 41, 
42 (2002). 
211. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 610 (citing Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness 
Socy., 421 U.S. 240, 260 (1975)). 
212. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 622. 
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Both Chief Justice Rehnquist's and Justice Scalia's statements 
suggest that congressional action is the appropriate remedy for 
the Buckhannon decision. 
Given the textualist requirements of the current Court's 
majority, 213 and Buckhannon's reliance on Black's Law 
Dictionary for the dispositive definition of "prevailing party," if 
Congress wishes to reincorporate the advantages of a modified 
"catalyst theory" into special education litigation, Congress 
must provide statutory text specifically redefining "prevailing 
party" for the purposes of the IDEA.214 
The current attorney fee-shifting sections of the IDEA 
contain the following provision: 
In any action or proceeding brought under this section, 
the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable 
attorneys' fees as part of the costs to the parents of a 
child with a disability who is the prevailing party.215 
Although there is no mention in this section that the "action or 
proceeding" result in a judgment or consent decree before a 
court may award attorneys' fees, to satisfy the requirements of 
Buckhannon, Congress should amend this single provision. 
Congress should insert language indicating that a court may 
deem a child with a disability the prevailing party and thus 
award parents their fees if the parents obtain either a 
judgment, a legally enforceable consent decree, or an 
enforceable settlement agreement.216 Congress may even go 
213. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's textualist approach to statutory 
interpretation, see supra n. 142. · 
214. Naturally, clarity of text is relative and a matter of perception. Unanticipated 
ambiguities do arise. When these ambiguities arise, textualist judges rely upon the 
common law cannons of construction. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, "Plain Meaning:" 
Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence of Strict Statutory Construction, 17 Harv. J. L. & Pub. 
Policy 401, 472 (1994) (cited in Wendy E. Parmet, Plain Meaning and Mitigating 
Measures: Judicial Interpretations of the Meaning of Disability, Berkeley J. Empl. & 
Lab. L. 53, 88 (2000)). See also Buzbee, supra n. 142, at 249. Congress must be careful 
to ensure that its clear language in the amended statute is readily amenable to a plain 
meaning interpretation. 
215. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (1997). 
216. Currently in the IDEA there is some discussion of parents rejecting good 
faith, substantial settlement offers. When parents do reject such offers, the court may 
deny them attorneys' fee recovery: 
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D) (1997)-"Prohibition of attorneys' fees and related 
costs for certain services" 
(i) Attorneys' fees may not be awarded and related costs may not be 
reimbursed in any action or proceeding under this section for services 
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further and fully revive the catalyst theory in special education 
litigation. They could do this by incorporating language that 
provides courts with the authority to deem parents "prevailing 
parties" when they have substantially achieved the relief they 
were seeking, regardless of judicial imprimatur or other formal 
outcome, and so long as the parents can demonstrate a causal 
connection between their proceeding or action and the 
defendant's action providing relief. 217 Such a modification of 
the attorneys' fee provisions will first sustain the congressional 
intent that attorneys' fee recovery be available to parents in 
special education litigation, and secondly, the modification 
would provide the statutory language to satisfy the current 
textualist Supreme Court majority. 
Other qualifications contained in the IDEA attorney fee-
shifting provision such as the provisions that prohibit the court 
from awarding attorneys' fees if parents unjustifiably reject a 
substantial settlement offer (see supra) underscore Congress' 
intent to encourage the bringing and speedy resolution of 
meritorious claims regardless of the parents' ability to pay for 
an attorney.218 These fee-shifting provisions are a strong 
means to further the objectives of the IDEA, namely the 
provision to each disabled child of a F APE designed to meet the 
child's unique needs. 
After Buckhannon, even if Congress chooses not to amend 
the general fee-shifting provision, 219 it should amend that 
portion of the IDEA attorney fee-shifting provisions that calls 
for sanctions against school districts or local educational 
agencies that unnecessarily protract litigation. Currently, the 
statute reads as follows: "The provisions of subparagraph (F) 
performed subsequent to the time of a written offer of settlement to a parent 
if-
(I) the offer is made within the time prescribed by Rule 68 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure or, in the case of an administrative proceeding, at 
any time more than 10 days before the proceeding begins; 
(II) the offer is not accepted within 10 days; and 
(III) the court or administrative hearing officer finds that the relief finally 
obtained by the parents is not more favorable to the parents than the offer of 
settlement. 
However, there is no explicit text in the current IDEA statute indicating that a parent 
or guardian who obtains an enforceable settlement agreement would be a "prevailing 
party" for purposes of the IDEA's fee-shifting provisions. 
217. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 627-28 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
218. Sen. Rpt. 105-17 (May 9, 1997). 
219. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (1997). 
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(prohibiting attorneys' fees to parents] shall not apply in any 
action or proceeding if the court finds that the State or local 
educational agency unreasonably protracted the final 
resolution of the action or proceeding or there was a violation of 
this section."22° Congress must change the law to overtly alert 
courts to enforce this existing section. Then, defendants in 
special education litigation could less easily tactically moot 
cases to avoid attorneys' fees. Overall, in combination with 
permitting the use of a revised catalyst theory in the awarding 
of fees, the amendments to the IDEA's fee-shifting provisions221 
should realign the incentives associated with the attorney fee-
shifting provisions of the IDEA so that they are once again 
consistent with the goals of the IDEA. 
Congress must act to restore a version of the catalyst theory 
acceptable to the Court in the attorney fee-shifting provisions 
of the IDEA. This will reduce the cost of litigation for parents, 
reduce the number and duration of cases, and more likely 
preserve IDEA's intent, providing equal protection to disabled 
children. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Buckhannon's rejection of the catalyst theory in attorney 
fee-shifting provisions of civil rights statutes has impaired 
parents' ability to enforce their disabled children's right to a 
F APE. By limiting prevailing party status to those plaintiffs 
who obtain judicial imprimaturs through judgments or court-
ordered consent decrees, Buckhannon has effectively reduced 
the number of disabled children who will receive a F APE. 
Under Buckhannon, even plaintiffs who "win" can easily "lose." 
Without a judicial imprimatur, "winning" parents who have 
obtained a F APE for their disabled child will often be liable for 
attorneys' fees far in excess of their "winning" claim's value. 
This outcome denies disabled children their equal protection 
rights, is contrary to the intent of the IDEA, and ultimately 
burdens society with more disabled adults who have not 
achieved self-sufficiency and independence through 
appropriate education. 
220. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(G) (1997). 
221. 20 U.S.C § 1415(i)(3)(B) (1997). 
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In some jurisdictions, court-based solutions to the 
Buckhannon problem in special education litigation are 
emerging. However, in light of the Court's reliance on Black's 
Law Dictionary in Buckhannon and the Court's preference for 
textualist statutory interpretation, Congress should carefully 
revise the text of the IDEA statute. This would be the quickest 
and most viable remedy available. Congress must redefine 
"prevailing party" for purposes of the IDEA and perhaps 
provide the statutory text necessary to delineate the specific 
boundaries of an acceptable catalyst theory within the attorney 
fee-shifting provisions of the Act. 
